Contribution and Indemnification Among Antitrust Coconspirators Revisited by Paul, Robert D.
Fordham Law Review 
Volume 41 Issue 1 Article 3 
1972 
Contribution and Indemnification Among Antitrust Coconspirators 
Revisited 
Robert D. Paul 
Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Robert D. Paul, Contribution and Indemnification Among Antitrust Coconspirators Revisited, 41 Fordham 
L. Rev. 67 (1972). 
Available at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr/vol41/iss1/3 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and 
History. It has been accepted for inclusion in Fordham Law Review by an authorized editor of FLASH: The Fordham 
Law Archive of Scholarship and History. For more information, please contact tmelnick@law.fordham.edu. 
Contribution and Indemnification Among Antitrust Coconspirators Revisited 
Cover Page Footnote 
Associate, Goodwin, Procter & Hoar, Boston, Massachusetts; member of the Massachusetts and District 
of Columbia Bars; LL.B., Harvard Law School; LL.M., New York University Graduate School of Law. Mr. 
Paul was a trial attorney with the Antitrust Division of the United States Department of Justice in 
Washington, D.C. from 1967 to 1970. 
This article is available in Fordham Law Review: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr/vol41/iss1/3 
CONTRIBUTION AND INDEMNIFICATION AMONG
ANTITRUST COCONSPIRATORS REVISITED
ROBERT D. PAUL*
I. INTRODUCTION
A N article appearing in the Fordham Law Review in 1962 entitled
"Apportionment of Damages and Contribution Among Coconspirators
in Antitrust Treble Damage Actions"1 began as follows:
The title of this article may be misleading because it implies that law exists on the
subject, whereas to the writer's knowledge, at least with respect to the question of
contribution, there is not a single decision in point.2
It is the purpose of this article to review and analyze the decisions which
have been rendered over the past decade on the subject of apportionment
of damages among antitrust coconspirators.
The question of the rights and liabilities of alleged or adjudged anti-
trust coconspirators, both among themselves and against coconspirators
who have not been joined, is of much greater significance today than in
1962. The increased antitrust activity in the early 1960's was but a
prelude to the tremendous volume of private antitrust treble damage
activity that would characterize the late 1960's and early 1970's. In addi-
tion, the courts have greatly expanded the concept of who is a possible
coconspirator in an antitrust situation.3 Finally, the growing popularity
* Associate, Goodwin, Procter & Hoar, Boston, Massachusetts; member of the Massachu-
setts and District of Columbia Bars; LL.B., Harvard Law School; LL.M., New York Uni-
versity Graduate School of Law. Mr. Paul was a trial attorney with the Antitrust Division
of the United States Department of Justice in Washington, D.C. from 1967 to 1970.
1. Corbett, Apportionment of Damages and Contribution among Coconspirators in
Antitrust Treble Damage Actions, 31 Fordham L. Rev. 111 (1962) [hereinafter cited as
Corbett].
2. Id.
3. Perhaps the most famous (or infamous) example of the expansion of this concept is
Mr. justice White's footnote 6 in Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145, 150 (1968). In this
case, a customer solicitation service which had won over the plaintiff-newspaper carrier's
customers, and the newspaper carrier which had replaced the plaintiff were found to be anti-
trust coconspirators with the Herald Company, a newspaper publishing firm. justice White
thereupon commented that an even wider range of coconspirators could conceivably be im-
plicated: "Petitioner's original complaint broadly asserted an illegal combination under § 1
of the Sherman Act. Under Parke, Davis [United States v. Parke, Davis & Co., 362 US.
29 (1960)] petitioner could have claimed a combination between respondent and himself, at
least as of the day he unwillingly complied with respondent's advertised price. Likewise,
he might successfully have claimed that respondent had combined with other carriers be-
cause the firmly enforced policy applied to all carriers, most of whom acquiesced in it. See
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of antitrust treble damage class actions is sure to encourage the naming
of a greater number of alleged coconspirators in order to assure the
capability of the defendants to pay the vast amount of damages generally
sought in such cases, and to enhance the possibilities of a settlement.
Unfortunately, the last decade has produced very little judicial guidance
concerning contribution or indemnification4 among antitrust coconspira-
tors. There have been only two federal court decisions on point-the first
in the Southern District of New York in Sabre Shipping Corp. v. American
President Lines, Ltd.,5 and the second in the Tenth Circuit Court of
Appeals in Wilshire Oil Co. v. Riffe.6 However, these decisions are highly
relevant: Sabre Shipping ruled against contribution among antitrust co-
conspirators, while Wilshire Oil is the only federal court decision per-
mitting indemnification among antitrust coconspirators. Since they are the
only federal court decisions concerning allocation of damages among
antitrust coconspirators, Sabre Shipping and Wilshire Oil must be carefully
analyzed in terms of the recovery possibilities they may offer one anti-
trust coconspirator as against another. In light of the court's denial of
contribution in Sabre Shipping, the possibilities for indemnification among
antitrust coconspirators must be given particular attention.
United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365, 372 (1967). These additional claims,
however, appear to have been abandoned by petitioner when he amended his complaint In
the trial court.
"Petitioner's amended complaint did allege a combination between respondent and peti-
tioner's customers. Because of our disposition of this case it is unnecessary to pass on this
claim. It was not, however, a frivolous contention. See Federal Trade Commission v. Beech-
Nut Packing Co., 257 U.S. 441 (1922); Girardi v. Gates Rubber Co. Sales Div., Inc., 325
F.2d 196 (9th Cir. 1963); Graham v. Triangle Publications, Inc., 233 F. Supp. 825 (E.D.
Pa. 1964), aff'd per curiam, 344 F.2d 775 (3d Cir. 1965)." 390 U.S. at 150 n.6.
The Supreme Court subsequently ratified this liberal approach toward proving antitrust
conspiracies in Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134 (1968):
"In any event each petitioner can dearly charge a combination between Midas and him-
self, as of the day he unwillingly complied with the restrictive franchise agreements, Al-
brecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145, 150, n.6 (1968); Simpson v. Union Oil Co., [377 U.S.
13 (1964)] or between Midas and other franchise dealers, whose acquiescence in Midas'
firmly enforced restraints was induced by 'the communicated danger of termination,' United
States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365, 372 (1967); United States v. Parke, Davis
& Co. 362 U.S. 29 (1960)." 392 U.S. at 142.
4. Contribution and indemnification are two different concepts. The majority of com-
mon law courts have not allowed contribution, i.e., the division of damages between Joint
tortfeasors. However they have, on occasion, permitted indemnification, i.e., shifting the
entire loss in order to fasten "the ultimate liability upon the one whose wrong has been
primarily responsible for the injury sustained." Union Stock Yards Co. v. Chicago, B. &
Q.R.R., 196 U.S. 217, 227 (1905). See notes 7-10 infra and accompanying text.
5. 298 F. Supp. 1339 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
6. 409 F.2d 1277 (10th Cir. 1969).
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II. THE SARE SHIPING DECISION
The 1962 article posed two fundamental questions which bad not then
been resolved by the courts in a claim for contribution between antitrust
treble damage defendants:
1. Is state law or federal law to apply in determining whether or not
contribution should be permitted?
2. If federal law is applicable, what is that law to be? There were sev-
eral possibilities:
(a) The majority common law rule which completely barred any
claim to contribution among joint tortfeasors;
(b) the minority common law rule which barred only intentional
joint tortfeasors from contribution; S
(c) a rule allocating responsibility in some fashion among intentional
and unintentional joint tortfeasors, such as found in state contribution
statutes9 and the Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act."0
Sabre Shipping was the first and remains the only federal decision to
have considered directly and to have answered these questions. It held
that federal common law is to be applied, and that this law is that there
is no contribution whatsoever among alleged antitrust coconspirators.
The complaint in Sabre Shipping charged that approximately thirty-
eight ocean shipping conference members had participated in a price
fixing conspiracy in violation of Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Anti-
Trust Act.'1 Specifically, Sabre Shipping Lines alleged that the defendant
conference members had concertedly reduced rates under the authority
of certain foreign shipping conferences and had thereby destroyed the
plaintiff's shipping business. Subsequent to the filing of Sabre's complaint,
twenty-five of the defendants settled with Sabre and entered into a cove-
nant not to sue. The complaint against these twenty-five defendants was
dismissed without prejudice. Five of the remaining defendants, after
moving unsuccessfully for summary judgment, filed a third party com-
plaint against seventeen of the settling defendants. The third party
complaint alleged that any liability arising from Sabre's claim would be
7. See Halcyon Lines v. Haenn Ship Ceiling & Refitting Corp., 342 U.S. 282 (1952). See
generally Corbett, supra note 1, at 129-32.
8. See Merryweather v. Nixan, 101 Eng. Rep. 1337 (K.B. 1799); Bailey v. Bussing, 28
Conn. 455 (1859); Nickerson v. Wheeler, 118 Mlass. 295 (1875). See generally Corbett,
supra note 1, at 132-34.
9. See, e.g., N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 1401 (McKinney 1963). See generally Corbett, supra note
1, at 134-36.
10. 9 Uniform Laws Ann. 233 (1957). See generally Corbett, supra note 1, at 134-36.
11. 15 US.C. §§ 1-2 (1970).
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joint as between the third party plaintiffs and defendants, and requested
contribution or indemnification in the event of a finding of liability. The
third party defendants moved for summary judgment.
Both the third party plaintiffs and defendants apparently agreed that
the court should find federal and not state law to be applicable, but dis-
agreed as to what the federal law, both as to contribution and indemnifica-
tion, was or should be. The third party plaintiffs asserted three basic
arguments: first, that in the absence of federal statutory and case law, the
court should formulate a uniform federal law in keeping with other federal
statutes which expressly provide for contribution, 2 federal local law as
fashioned for the District of Columbia, 3 and the trend in state statutory
law to favor contribution;' 4 second, that since the third party plaintiffs
were not in pari delicto with the third party defendants, they should be
indemnified by the third party defendants in the event of a finding of
liability; third, that the third party defendants had agreed in a shipping
conference agreement, to which all the original defendants were parties,
to share liability among all conference members for acts done in compli-
ance with the agreement. In sum, the third party plaintiffs claimed that as
a matter of federal antitrust law they were entitled to contribution from
their alleged coconspirators, and that both as a matter of federal antitrust
law and common law contractual obligation, they were entitled to indemni-
fication.' 5
12. "There is no provision in the antitrust statutes providing for contribution, but the
third party plaintiffs urge that the fact that such a provision is found in the Securities Act
of 1933 and 1934 should lead this Court to hold that, in the absence of statute, such a right
should be recognized as support for allowing contribution among antitrust conspirators." 298
F. Supp. at 1345 (citation omitted).
13. "Finally, they would have us adopt and follow decisions emanating from the Dis-
trict Court in Washington, D. C., particularly Knell v. Feltman, 85 U.S. App. D.C. 22, 174
F.2d 662 [(D.C. Cir. 1949)], which limiting the Merryweather rule to intentional torts, held
to the rule adopted in 1942 for the District Court that as between two unintentional wrong-
doers, that is, two defendants found to be negligent whose negligence contributed to plain-
tiffs harm, there could be contribution without the need for a joint judgment against them."
Id.
14. "The trend of state law appears to be in favor of having all wrongdoers contribute
financially to a recovery. Twenty-three (23) states have legislation favoring contribution in
varying degrees; six of them, including New York, limit contribution to joint judgment
defendants while the others have adopted in whole or in part the Uniform Contribution
Among Joint Tort Feasors Act." Id. at 1343 n.1.
15. It is to be noted that the third party plaintiffs' crossclaim, while based in part on
federal antitrust law, did not allege a violation of the antitrust laws by the third party de-
fendants which damaged them directly, and for which they sought treble damages. Rather,
they claimed that if the plaintiff established its claim for treble damages under the anti-
trust laws, then the third party defendants were liable in whole or in part for these damages.
[Vol. 41
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The third party defendants contended that federal common law did
not permit contribution and that this was the law that should be applied,
regardless of state law. Secondly, they argued that the third party plaintiffs'
claim for indemnification under federal antitrust law must fail because
the claim, resting on a theory of a passive tortfeasor claiming against an
active tortfeasor, would not lie when joint wrongdoing was alleged. Finally,
they argued that indemnification under the shipping conference agreement
should not be allowed as a matter of public policy and as a matter of
contract law.
The court quickly disposed of any doubts as to whether state or federal
law was applicable. It determined that the relevant economic interests
before the court, and the basis of its jurisdiction, were federal. Moreover,
the respective rights of the defendants among themselves were in question
because a federal statute had condemned certain acts as unlawful. Ac-
cordingly, federal law was to be applied."8
The court then considered the question of what the federal law on
contribution was or should be:
In the United States, the federal common law rule, not limited to intentional torts,
emerges from Union Stockyards Co. v. Chicago, B. & Q.R.R. Co., 196 U.S. 217, 25
S. Ct. 226, 49 L.Ed. 453 (1905), which holds that, as between two defendants in pari
delicto, contribution or indemnity would not lie at the suit of the defendant who had
been sued individually, had been found actively negligent, and had paid the judgmenL
The reason given was that contribution or indemnity lies only in those cases where
the defendant sued is found to be only passively negligent.17
The court then observed that the United States Supreme Court had
never modified its holding in Union Stock Yards even when the opportunity
was present to fashion its own federal rule on contribution. 8 The court
Cf. United States v. Scophony Corp. of America, 69 F. Supp. 666 (S.D.N.Y. 1946), rev'd on
other grounds, 333 U.S. 795 (1948), in which Scophony Corporation, named as a coconspira-
tor with several other defendants, cross-claimed for treble damages against these defendants
alleging antitrust violations injuring it arising out of the same subject matter as the gov-
ernment's complaint. See also Old Homestead Bread Co. v. Continental Baking Co., 47 F.RD.
560 (D. Colo. 1969) (permitting antitrust treble damage crossclaim by alleged antitrust co-
conspirator against other alleged defendant coconspirators) ; Borden Co. v. Sylk, 42 F.RD.
429 (E-D. Pa. 1967) (allowing antitrust crossclaim for treble damages under the Robinson-
Patman Act in a suit brought originally to collect on promissory notes).
16. 298 F. Supp. at 1343-44. The Supreme Court appears to have buttressed the court's
conclusion that federal law should be applied when in Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hahltine
Research, Inc., 401 U.S. 321 (1971), it assumed that the question of whether the release of
one antitrust defendant released his coconspirators was a matter to be determined under
federal law without reference to a particular state's rule on releases.
17. 298 F. Supp. at 1343-44.
18. "Almost fifty years after the Union Stock Yards case, in Halcyon Lines v. Haenn
Ship Ceiling & Refitting Corp., 342 U.S. 282, the Court made it clear that it had no intention
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pointed out that the Supreme Court has recognized indemnification as
being possible under the federal common law, while contribution remained
completely barred by the Court. 9
The court ruled that not only were all considerations of contribution
to be excluded from the third party plaintiffs' complaint, but all considera-
tions of indemnification (apart from the contract claim) were also to be
excluded:
[Indemnification] cannot be applied to the claim here for it is charged that all the
defendants acted as joint conspirators under the one agreement and there can be no
independent duty owed from one to the other. The legal considerations underlying
indemnity find no room for application to co-conspirators who act as agents for one
another and are particeps criminis. 20
The court found no merit in the third party plaintiffs' arguments in
favor of contribution. As to the argument that federal statutes expressly
permitting contribution, such as the Securities Acts of 1933 and 1934,
lent support to recognizing contribution where the federal statute was
silent, the court rather viewed Congressional silence in the antitrust area
as an indication that contribution was to be excluded. The court also
pointed out that a rule such as that applied in the District of Columbia
of departing from the common law rule against contribution with the following language:
In the absence of legislation, courts exercising a common-law jurisdiction have generally
held that they cannot on their own initiative create an enforceable right of contribution as
between joint tortfeasors.
We have concluded that it would be unwise to attempt to fashion new judicial rules of
contribution and that the solution of this problem should await congressional action." Id. at
1344 (citations omitted).
19. "What the Court has done in the interests of justice in federal maritime law where
the shipowner is ...held liable without fault, is to permit impleader of the stevedore on the
theory not of contribution but of indemnity, much as that discussed in the Union Stock
Yards case. The claim recognized is that of an independent wrong done by the Impleaded
defendant, not to plaintiff but to the defendant sued, arising out of a breach of a contract
for services to be rendered by the third party defendant and a concomitant right on the part
of the third party defendant to counterclaim. This was the holding of Federal Marine
Terminals, Inc. v. Shipping Co., 394 U.S. 404, in language which shows how deep-rooted
in our jurisprudence is the common law rule against contribution: 'This holding is In no wise
a departure from our decisions in Halcyon Lines v. Haenn Ship Ceiling & Refitting Corp., 342
U.S. 282, that we would not "fashion new judicial rules of contribution" between the ship-
owner and the stevedoring contractor as joint tortfeasors. Marine Terminals is not seeking
contribution. It is not asking Burnside to share responsibility for their joint negligence with
respect to McNeill. Rather the counterclaim seeks recovery of the full amount of Marine
Terminals' liability under the Act to McNeill's representative; and it is founded not on
Burnside Shipping's wrong to McNeill but on its independent wrong to Marine Terminals.'"
Id. (emphasis deleted) (citations omitted).
20. Id. at 1345 (citation omitted).
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courts allowing contribution among unintentional joint tortfeasors was
not only inappropriate in the Sabre Shipping situation, which involved
alleged intentional wrongdoing, but also inconsistent with the rulings of
the Supreme Court.21 It concluded:
If the Supreme Court was reluctant to depart from the rule as between unintentional
tortfeasors,.. . how presumptuous it would be for this Court to do so for the benefit
of intentional wrongdoers, whose acts are so severly castigated by Congress, to the point
of providing criminal sanctions including imprisonment. Congress is well aware of the
state trend toward contribution; it must be presumed to have good reason for not
modifying the common law rule, application of which does no violence to Congressional
intent. The private antitrust suit serves an important public purpose of presenting "an
ever present threat to deter anyone contemplating business behavior in violation of
the antitrust laws." If one or two defendants sued by a plaintiff, who alleges in this
case it has been driven out of business, could turn around and implead all other persons
directly and indirectly involved in the alleged conspiracy, it could well spell death to
the plaintiff's suit and thus thwart the statutory purpose. Plaintiff's choice to sue those
of the defendants it considers most culpable or most capable of making him whole
would be totally nullified, and control of his action would be taken out of his hands. It
would operate to prevent his receiving prompt recovery since no defendant would
settle with him if he was to find himself back in the suit as a third party defendant.
We conclude that, even though plaintiff had originally sued all defendants as joint
tortfeasors, it had the absolute right to settle with some of them and covenant not to
continue its suit against them, while reserving its right to continue against the non-
settling defendants.22
Although the court dismissed the third party plaintiffs' claim to indemni-
fication as a matter of antitrust law, it declined to dismiss their claim for
indemnification based upon the third party defendants' participation in
the shipping conference agreement, and ruled that the ultimate merits of
this contract claim should await final determination of Sabre's antitrust
claims .a
III. THE SABRE SHIPPING DECISION ANALYZED
A. Contribution
Obviously, the Sabre Shipping decision will give little comfort to an
alleged antitrust coconspirator who may consider impleading, or cross-
claiming against, another coconspirator for contribution or indemnification.
There appears to be no way to read the court's decision except as denying
21. Id. at 1346.
22. Id. (citation omitted). The Supreme Court's holding in Zenith Radio Corp. v.
Hazeltine Research, Inc., 401 U.S. 321, 347 (1971), that "a party releases only those other
parties whom he intends to release" would appear to be consistent with the district court's
emphasis on a plaintiff's freedom to settle. However, it should be noted that the Supreme
Court did not deal with the separate issues of contribution and indemnification in Zenith.
23. 298 F. Supp. at 1347.
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contribution in all circumstances-whether the plaintiff has chosen to
name all coconspirators as defendants or not. This holding may present
some significant and perhaps harsh consequences for an alleged antitrust
coconspirator. For example, consider the plight of a distributor who is a
party to a vertical price-fixing or tie-in arrangement which has been forced
upon him by a manufacturer, coupled with the presence of an injured and
litigious competitor who has decided to sue. 4 Under Sabre Shipping, the
extent of the distributor's liability and his very financial existence may
well rest on such vagaries as how many defendants the competitor chooses
to name, the financial condition of the particular defendants named, the
basis on which the competitor may settle with some defendants, or simply,
on where jurisdiction or venue is proper. In our example, if both the
distributor and the manufacturer are named as defendants, and juris-
diction and venue are proper, and the manufacturer is financially sound,
fortune has, to some extent, smiled on the distributor. Since both the
manufacturer and the distributor have been named as codefendants and
will share damages in the event of a finding of liability, contribution is
not a relevant concern, except in the event of settlement between the
manufacturer and the competitor.25 However, if the manufacturer is not
named as a defendant because of jurisdiction, venue, the distributor's
financial resources, the manufacturer's lack thereof, or any number of
reasons, the distributor may be in a very unfortunate position. Under the
Sabre holding, he may be forced to pay the competitor's entire treble
damage claim, plus the competitor's attorneys' fees, without any op-
portunity of seeking contribution from the manufacturer. While it is true
that the Supreme Court's holding in Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. Interna-
tional Parts Corp. may permit the distributor to sue the manufacturer
for triple his damages arising from the antitrust violation, there is no
precedent for his claiming (in his antitrust suit against the manufacturer)
24. Coercion is not necessarily a defense to a charge of antitrust conspiracy. For example,
the Supreme Court stated in United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131 (1948):
"There is some suggestion on this as well as on other phases of the cases that large ex-
hibitors with whom defendants dealt fathered the illegal practices and forced them onto
the defendants. But as the District Court observed, that circumstance if true does not help
the defendant. For acquiescence in an illegal scheme is as much a violation of the Sherman
Act as the creation and promotion of one." Id. at 161.
See also Perma Life Mufflers v. International Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134 (1968); Albrecht
v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145 (1968); Flintkote v. Lysfjord, 246 F.2d 368 (9th Cir. 1957);
United States v. General Elec. Co., 82 F. Supp. 753 (D.NJ. 1949).
25. If the manufacturer and the competitor settle, the burden of the distributor is al-
leviated to the extent that the settlement amount is credited against plaintiff's claimed
damages. See E. Timberlake, Federal Treble Damage Antitrust Actions 364 (1965).
26. 392 U.S. 134 (1968).
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that his injury includes his treble damage payments to the competitor.2-
Indeed, it is not inconceivable that the distributor has benefited financially
from the restrictive arrangement, and has no damages at all to claim in an
antitrust suit against the manufacturer.
B. Indemnification
If Sabre Shipping is eventually followed by other federal courtss and
contribution is barred among antitrust coconspirators, indemnification may
be the only remaining legal basis for apportioning damages among anti-
trust coconspirators.
The court in Sabre Shipping distinguished between indemnification
among coconspirators.sought on a theory of independent duty owed from
one coconspirator to another, and indemnification among coconspirators
claimed under the antitrust laws. The court did not dismiss the third party
plaintiffs' claim for indemnification based on contractual liability arising
from the shipping conference agreement.29 It did deny their claim for
indemnification under the antitrust laws, however, ruling that "no indepen-
dent duty owed from one to the other" because they had intentionally
acted as coconspirators under the agreement."' The court did not make
it clear whether indemnification claimed under the antitrust laws should
be barred in all circumstances or only under such facts as alleged in Sabre
Shipping. Is indemnification still possible under the antitrust laws where
coercion by a coconspirator is alleged, or if an alleged coconspirator can
demonstrate at trial that he, as opposed to other coconspirators, did not
intentionally violate the antitrust laws? There are indications in the Sabre
Shipping opinion that the court may not have intended to bar indemni-
fication absolutely and was addressing itself only to the facts in the case
before it.
One indication is that the court's ruling on indemnification is stated in
terms of Sabre Shipping's complaint, which alleged intentional joint
wrongdoing by all defendants. A second indication is that the court cites
27. Possibly one reason for a lack of precedent, other than the novelty of the issue, is
that the distributor's participation in the conspiracy may act as a supervening factor be-
tween the manufacturer's antitrust violation and the distributor's antitrust claim for damages
paid to the competitor. That is, a direct causal connection between manufacturer's antitrust
violation and the distributor's liability to the competitor may be difficult to establish.
28. Sabre Shipping has not been cited in a reported federal court decision. However,
this most likely reflects not a criticism of the decision as much as the infrequent occurrence
of these issues.
29. 298 F. Supp. at 1345. See text accompanying note 23 supra.
30. 298 F. Supp. at 1345. See text accompanying note 20 supra.
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the district court's decision in dellaas v. Empire Petroleum Co.,8 '1 for
the proposition that there could be no indemnification among antitrust
coconspirators alleged to be in pari delicto. However, the court in detlaas
expressly held that there could be indemnification under the Securities and
Exchange Act of 193432 where liability for participation in an illegal
scheme attached only by operation of law:
Empire's third-party complaint stands on a different footing. A corporation is a
principal which can be liable for fraud only through the conduct of its agents. Since
Empire's liability would attach only through operation of law, an unfavorable verdict
on the main complaint would not bar it from seeking indemnification from those officers
and directors who directly participated in the fraud. The motion for summary judgment
to dismiss Empire's claim for indemnification will be denied.83
An additional indication that the court's decision was intended to be
limited to cases involving alleged intentional joint wrongdoing is that its
discussion of the development of federal common law on indemnification
does permit indemnification in certain instances. As discussed above,
4
the court relies primarily on the Supreme Court's decision in Union Stock
Yards5 for its statement of the federal common law. Union Stock Yards
states in relevant part:
[T]he general principle of law is well settled that one of several wrongdoers cannot
recover against another wrongdoer, although he may have been compelled to pay all
the damages for the wrong done. In many instances, however, cases have been taken
out of this general rule, and it has been held inoperative in order that tho ultimate loss
may be visited upon the principal wrongdoer, who is made to respond for all the
damages, where one less culpable, although legally liable to third persons, may escape
the payment of damages assessed against him by putting the ultimate loss upon the
one principally responsible for the injury done.30
Other cases might be cited, which are applications of the exception engrafted upon
31. 286 F. Supp. 809 (D. Colo. 1968), modified on other grounds, 435 F.2d 1223 (10th
Cir. 1970).
32. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78hh-1 (1970).
33. 286 F. Supp. at 816, citing Handel-Mastschappij II. Albert Do Bary & Co., NV v.
Faradyne Elec. Corp., 37 F.R.D. 357 (S.D.N.Y. 1964). The Handel-Mastscliappij case Is an
interesting one. The District Court for the Southern District of New York denied a third
party defendant's motion to dismiss a third party complaint seeking indemnification where
the third party defendant, an underwriter, passed on as current an outdated prospectus of
the defendant without the defendant's authorization:
"'Thus where the parties are not in pari delicto as where a principal is liable by operation
of law for the affirmative tortious conduct of his agent the former is entitled to Indemnlfi.
cation from the latter and may implead said agent as a party who is or may be liable over
to him.'" Id. at 359 (citation omitted).
34. See text accompanying note 17 supra.
35. Union Stockyards Co. v. Chicago, B. & Q.R.R., 196 U.S. 217 (1905).
36. Id. at 224 (emphasis added).
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the general rule of non-contribution among wrongdoers, holding that the law will
inquire into the facts of a case of the character shown with a view to fastening the
ultimate liability upon the one whose wrong has been primarily responsible for the
injury sustained.37
Moreover, as noted above," the district court relied on the Supreme
Court's adherence to the Union Stock Yards holding as set forth in its
subsequent maritime law decisions, Halcyon Lines v. Haenn Ship Ceiling
& Refitting Corp. 9 and Federal Marine Terminals, Inc. v. Burnside Ship-
ping Co.40 The court in Sabre Shipping expressly recognized that these
decisions, while barring contribution, clearly allowed for indemnifica-
tion, at least in the instance where the shipowner had been held liable
without fault.41
From the viewpoint of the issue of indemnification among antitrust
coconspirators, it is unfortunate that the court did not clarify the
circumstances in which it would recognize the possibility of indemnifica-
tion. In the final analysis, perhaps all that can be said definitely of the
Sabre Skipping decision is: (1) it left open the possibility of indemnifica-
tion among antitrust coconspirators based on a contractual obligation
independent of the antitrust claim asserted; and (2) an argument can be
made that the decision did not eliminate indemnification under every
circumstance as a matter of antitrust law and that indemnification in
instances other than intentional joint antitrust violations is possible. Be-
cause of the court's lack of clarity, the Sabre Shipping opinion may not
be persuasive in subsequent decisions on the issue of indemnification among
antitrust coconspirators. If this proves to be true and the Sabre Shipping
decision is discounted on the issue of indemnification, the Wilshire Oil
decision42 may be our only guide. Wilshire Oil holds quite clearly that,
at least in one instance, indemnification is possible among antitrust cocon-
spirators.
IV. THE WiLsH'm OIL DECISION
As discussed above, the court in Sabre Shipping declined to dismiss
the third party plaintiffs' claim for indemnification based on the shipping
conference agreement, and ruled that the ultimate merits of this contract
claim should await final determination of Sabre's antitrust claims. Thus,
37. Id. at 227 (emphasis added).
38. See notes 18 & 19 supra and accompanying text.
39. 342 U.S. 282 (1952).
40. 394 US. 404 (1969).
41. 298 F. Supp. at 1344.
42. Wlshire Oil Co. v. Rifle, 409 F.2d 1277 (10th Cir. 1969).
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the Sabre Shipping decision can be read as recognizing the possibility of
indemnification where a claim for indemnification is based on a legal
principle independent of the antitrust laws. Such a reading would appear
to be supported by the Tenth Circuit's decision in Wilshire Oil. This case
involved a claim for indemnification based on an obligation other than
under the antitrust laws. The court held that such a claim for indemni-
fication could properly lie, even as between antitrust coconspirators.
The essential facts of the Wilshire Oil decision are as follows:
The Wilshire Oil Company of Texas (Wilshire) incurred various
penalties, damages and expenses in conjunction with criminal and civil
antitrust suits filed against it as the result of its Rifle Petroleum Division's
conspiracy to fix the prices of asphalt. These penalties, damages and
expenses included a fine paid pursuant to a nolo contendere plea, settle-
ment payments in a civil action, and attorneys' fees and expenses incurred
in these criminal and civil antitrust actions. Wilshire then sued Masterson,
one of Rifle's salesmen, and various other employees for indemnification.
Wilshire claimed that the unauthorized price-fixing activities of Master-
son and the other employees were breaches of the fiduciary duty owed
to Wilshire, and were the sole cause for Wilshire's incurring liability. As
the Kansas district court summed up Wilshire's claim: "In effect, Wil-
shire claims that it unknowingly and innocently bought an on-going con-
spiracy when it acquired Rifle Petroleum Company." 43
As damages, Wilshire claimed all amounts which it had paid in satisfac-
tion of any judgments, fines and settlements, and all expenses attributable
to those actions.
Masterson moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim
upon which relief could be granted. The district court granted the
motion 44 on the basis that it would violate general public policy and
frustrate the purposes of the antitrust laws to permit indemnification:
Success by this plaintiff in the present action would mean that the nineteen other
criminal defendants who pleaded nolo contendere to the same charges could seek out
some of their corporate officers and agents, and escape effective criminal punishment.
To sanction this would defeat one of the basic purposes of the antitrust laws.
[ * T]he conclusion is inevitable that the punishment assessed or possibly to be
assessed against Wilshire must be borne by the corporation as such, without benefit of
exoneration or indemnity, and that it was not the intent of Congress that a corporation
43. No. KC-2716 (D. Kan., Feb. 16, 1968), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 409 F.2d
1277 (10th Cir. 1969).
44. Wilshire's claim against two other employees was dismissed by the district court for
lack of jurisdiction. The district court was affirmed by the court of appeals on this decision,
409 F.2d at 1279-81.
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should, in effect, escape punishment for violation of the antitrust laws by later recover-
ing from its agents any fines or criminal recoveries assessed against it.4
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals unanimously overturned the district
court's decision and held that Wilshire could seek indemnification against
Masterson for all actual damages and expenses claimed." The court
repudiated the district court's assumption that to permit indemnification
would frustrate the purposes of the antitrust laws:
[I]t is essential to appreciate the specific theory upon which this claim is based. The
liability of the employee is premised upon a breach of the fiduciary duty owed to the
corporation. The fact that this breach of duty is sought to be demonstrated by referring
to an antitrust violation does not operate to convert the suit into one arising under
antitrust laws .... There is therefore no occasion to gauge appellant's remedial rights
by the statutory penalties either in the sense of being concerned with treble damages
or with the exclusivity or preemption of those rights by the antitrust laws. It follows
that the fact that antitrust remedies have been provided by statute does not deprive
Wilshire of its traditional common law right to recover for injuries occasioned by
errant employees. 47
V. THE WILSHIRE OIL DECISION AND INDEMNIFICATION
AMONG ANTITRUST COCONSPIRATORs ANALYZED
It could be argued that the Wilshire Oil decision related only to a unique
fact pattern involving purely vicarious liability as between a corporation
and an employee. However, there appears to be no reason to give the
decision such a narrow reading, provided that an independent duty owed
by one coconspirator to another, and its breach resulting in liability, can
be demonstrated. A breach of fiduciary duty as alleged in Wilshire Oil,
a breach of a contractual obligation, as alleged in Sabre Shipping, or the
breach of any duty or obligation which resulted in one alleged cocon-
spirator having to pay an antitrust judgment should be grounds for seeking
indemnification.
Of course, a broad reading of the Wilshire Oil decision would be ap-
propriate only in cases where the granting of indemnification would be
consistent, or at least not inconsistent, with the purposes of the antitrust
laws. This is an obvious prerequisite, but unfortunately, one that is diffi-
cult to deal with. Neither the antitrust statutes themselves, nor their
legislative history, mention indemnification among coconspirators. More-
over, judicial guidance on the matter has been sparse and far from clear.
Fundamental to the Wilshire Oil decision is a recognition by the court of
appeals that granting indemnification among antitrust coconspirators does
45. No. KC-2716 (D. Kan. Feb. 16, 1968).
46. 409 F.2d at 1283-84.
47. Id. at 1284 (citations omitted).
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not necessarily violate the spirit and objectives of the federal antitrust
laws.48 On the other hand, the Supreme Court, in its 1968 decision in
Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp.,4" emphasized that
the public interest and statutory aim of deterring antitrust violations and
enforcing the antitrust laws are of paramount importance, and are to over-
ride considerations of individual equities as between antitrust cocon-
spirators."°
In Perma Life Muffler, the court held that a treble damage plaintiff,
who may have some culpability as to an arrangement in violation of the
antitrust laws, is not barred by the doctrine of in pari delicto from bring-
ing suit against a more reprehensible coconspirator. 1 The rationale behind
the Perma Life decision, as expressed by the Court, was that antitrust
suits are to be encouraged, even though the prospective plaintiff may be
reprehensible to some degree, and even though a successful suit may
result in windfall profits for the plaintiff.52
Although by analogy the Perma Life decision provides some guidance
on the issue of indemnification between antitrust coconspirators of varying
degrees of culpability, the question of the consistency of indemnification
with the objectives of the antitrust laws is far from answered. Substantial
arguments can be raised in support of either side of this issue.
These arguments can perhaps best be illustrated from the viewpoint
of our hypothetical distributor.5 3 Recall that this distributor was co-
erced or pressured by the manufacturer to maintain resale prices or to
purchase a less desireable product of the manufacturer in order to obtain
the product he wanted in the first place. Suppose that the distributor now
faces an antitrust suit by the manufacturer's competitor, either alone or
with the manufacturer as codefendant. As noted above, if the distributor
alone has been sued, he faces the possibility of paying all of the plaintiff's
damages plus attorneys' fees. If both the distributor and the manufacturer
are sued, the distributor may be held liable for at least half of the award
to the plaintiff. Accordingly, the distributor may seriously consider cross-
claiming against or impleading the manufacturer for indemnification.
In support of his claim for indemnification, the distributor would cer-
tainly offer proof that he is not an intentional coconspirator,5 4 or not the
48. See id.
49. 392 U.S. 134 (1968).
50. Id. at 138-39.
51. Id. at 139.
52. Id.
53. See notes 24-27 supra and accompanying text.
54. See Sabre Shipping Corp. v. American President Lines, 298 F. Supp. 1339, 1345
(S.D.N.Y. 1969) ; text accompanying note 20 supra.
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one "primarily responsible for the injury sustained."" In accordance with
the Wilshire Oil holding, the distributor could also argue that a duty or
obligation owed to him, other than under the antitrust laws, had been
breached by the manufacturer. The disposition of this issue would, of
course, depend on the facts of the case, unless the court chose simply to
recognize that the manufacturer breached his duty not to pressure or
coerce the distributor into a violation of the antitrust laws.
Would it be inconsistent with the objectives of the antitrust laws to grant
indemnification to the distributor? As discussed above,m the Supreme
Court ruled in Perina Life Muffler that the more culpable antitrust cocon-
spirator should be made to bear the burden of liability for antitrust viola-
tions." Moreover, the deterrent purposes of the antitrust laws"8 would
certainly be served if the manufacturer had to face the possibility that he
may be found liable for damages not only in an antitrust suit brought by
the distributor, but also through indemnification of the distributor for the
treble antitrust damages he may have paid. It could also be argued that,
without a right of indemnification, the distributor could incur antitrust lia-
bility which could be enormously and perhaps unjustly greater than the
damages he might claim against the manufacturer in his own antitrust suit.
There is also the practical consideration that if the distributor is forced to
pay treble damages plus attorneys' fees to the competitor, whether shared
with the manufacturer or not, he may be deprived of the economic where-
withal to launch his own antitrust suit against the manufacturer.
From the viewpoint of aiding government enforcement of the antitrust
laws, the distributor would appear to have a much greater incentive to re-
port the manufacturer's antitrust violations to the government, or to testify
on the government's behalf concerning the illegal scheme, if he had the
assurance that he could seek indemnification in treble damage private ac-
tions which might arise as a result of his disclosure of the conspiracy. This
reasoning is consistent with the apparent tendency of government enforce-
ment authorities to prosecute the more active and responsible participants
in an antitrust conspiracy rather than prosecuting every theoretical cocon-
spirator.
Finally, it is arguable that the distributor is not necessarily excluded
from the group which the antitrust laws were designed to protect. To some
extent, the distributor is a victim of the antitrust violation in that the man-
ufacturer has coerced him to enter into the illegal schemeP0
55. See Union Stockyards Co. v. Chicago, B. & Q.R.R., 196 U.S. 217, 227 (1905).
56. See text accompanying notes 49-52 supra.
57. 392 U.S. at 138-39.
58. See id. at 139; Flintkote Co. v. Lysfjord, 246 F.2d 368 (9th Cir. 1957).
59. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals in Johnson v. J. H. Yost Lumber Co., 117
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On the other hand, it is possible that a cross-claim or impleader based
on the distributor's claim for indemnification could interfere with the plain-
tiff's right to retain control of his antitrust suit. The importance of this
right was emphasized by the district court in Sabre Shipping."0 However,
it must be remembered that the Sabre Shipping court did acknowledge the
possibility of indemnification under the contractual obligations of the ship-
ping conference agreement, and was willing to entertain this claim pending
a determination of the validity of the plaintiff's claim.
A second argument against indemnification is that barring the distribu-
tor from being indemnified could create a substantial deterrent to his enter-
ing into arrangements that are illegal under the antitrust laws. Generally
speaking, however, it would seem more important to create such a deter-
rent with respect to the more culpable party, in this case, the manufac-
turer.
Perhaps more persuasive is the argument that indemnifying the distrib-
utor would relieve him of liability for his acquiescence in the illegal ar-
rangement. Indeed, not only would he be relieved of liability, but under
Perma Life Muffler the possibility is open that he may reap windfall prof-
its in a treble damage suit against the manufacturer.01 Moreover, it could
be argued that denying the distributor indemnification in the suit by the
manufacturer's competitor is consistent with the spirit of Perma Life Muf-
fler in that, unindemnified, the distributor would have more incentive to
commence his own antitrust suit against the manufacturer in an attempt
to alleviate some of the liability he may have incurred in the competitor's
suit.
VI. CONCLUSION
The article appearing in this Law Review in 1962 noted that perhaps one
explanation for the complete lack of authority in the area of contribution
and indemnification among antitrust coconspirators was that most treble
damage codefendants tend to agree upon their respective liabilities among
F.2d 53 (8th Cir. 1941) indicates that a party coerced by coconspirators into acting in
accordance with the conspiracy is to be treated as a victim and not a beneficiary of the
restrictions imposed on him:
"The combination and conspiracy charged . . . was a combination to deflect the natural
course of trade. Such a combination is not only an unlawful invasion of the rights of the
parties at whom the concert of action is aimed, but also of the parties who are to be coerced
into refusing business relations with them." Id. at 61.
60. 298 F. Supp. at 1346.
61. 392 U.S. at 139.
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themselves.6" The Sabre Shipping and Wilshire Oil cases illustrate two in-
stances over the past ten years in which such liability could not be settled
among alleged or adjudged coconspirators without raising the issues of
contribution and indemnification before a federal court. To be sure, two
instances over a decade is a very small number. However, the increasing
number of private treble damage actions make it quite likely that, in the
absence of legislation, the courts will face these issues more frequently in
the future.
It must be recognized that a complicated legal issue raised only twice
over a decade is not the stuff of which readily forthcoming legislation is
made. Thus, it is highly likely that the next federal court to be confronted
with the issue of contribution, or more likely, indemnification, among anti-
trust coconspirators will have only Sabre Shipping and Wilshire Oil as
precedent. Likewise, the antitrust attorney may well have only these two
decisions as guidelines, and will continue to face an extremely difficult
problem in advising a client named as an antitrust coconspirator of his
rights vis-4-vis other alleged coconspirators.
As to contribution, it is difficult from the standpoint of legal analysis to
fault the district court's opinion in Sabre Shipping barring contribution as
a matter of federal common law. Nevertheless, it will still be difficult for an
attorney to explain to a client why one coconspirator, particularly a cocon-
spirator who may be less responsible for an antitrust violation than others,
may be forced to shoulder the entire burden of triple damage liability with-
out recourse to contribution from his more reprehensible coconspirators.
One significant result of the Sabre Shipping ban on contribution may be
an emphasis by defendants' attorneys, and perhaps by other federal courts,
on the possibilities of indemnification. It is submitted that, while the argu-
ments against indemnification set forth above do merit consideration, it
should be recognized that attempts to allocate liability among antitrust co-
conspirators are not necessarily inconsistent with the objectives of the anti-
trust laws. The seemingly unjust possibility that one coconspirator will be
required to pay a much greater amount in damages to an injured third
party than he could claim against the coconspirator who coerced him into
the illegal conduct should be reduced by allowing indemnification. To
avoid the possibility that a less culpable coconspirator could collect in-
demnification plus windfall profits in his own antitrust suit against a cocon-
spirator, perhaps an indemnified coconspirator should be barred from ini-
tiating a triple damage suit if he claims indemnification. He would thereby
be compelled to elect the remedy which would most redound to his benefit,
62. Corbett, supra note 1, at 111.
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while the coconspirator would still feel the bite of having to pay for his
antitrust violation.
The Sabre Shipping and Wilshire Oil decisions can be read as permitting
indemnification at least where it is founded on an obligation or duty other
than under the antitrust laws. Predicating indemnification on such an in-
dependent legal duty or obligation may well serve to establish rational
boundaries to a coconspirator's claim for indemnification rather than per-
mit automatic indemnity under the antitrust laws. Sabre Shipping does not
answer, and Wilshire Oil did not consider, the question of whether
indemnification is ever possible as a matter of federal antitrust law. How-
ever, there seems to be little reason why a judge or jury could not evaluate
the various degrees of culpability among defendant antitrust coconspira-
tors, when such a judge or jury is expected, under Perma Life Mufler, to
make this same type of evaluation when a coconspirator sues another co-
conspirator under the antitrust laws.
